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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal by virtue of the provisions of 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(j) (Rep.Vol. 9 2002). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Court below err in granting the defendants1 motion for a 
protective order and denying plaintiff's motion to compel discovery? Trial court 
rulings on motions to compel and for protective orders are reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard. Park v. Case, 2001 UT App. 232. The issue was preserved by the 
parties' respective motions and memoranda. R. File #3 at 785-833. 
2. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment based upon 
plaintiff's failure to make a pretrial demonstration of its entitlement to relief? The 
grant of a motion for summary judgment is reviewed without deference to the trial 
court. Macris & Associates, Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2002 UT App. 406. The issue was 
preserved by plaintiff's memorandum in opposition to defendants' motion. R. File #3 
at 1052-1066. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
The present action was commenced in 1995 when Macris & Associates, Inc. 
sued Neways, Inc. and Thomas and Leslie Mower in an effort to set aside a fraudulent 
transfer. The complaint alleged that the Mowers caused one corporation they 
controlled, Images & Attitudes, Inc., to transfer all its assets to another corporation 
1 
they controlled, Neways, Inc., in an effort to place such assets beyond the reach of 
Macris, which then had a pending breach of contract claim against Images. The Macris 
claim against Images ultimately resulted in a judgment for Macris that was affirmed on 
appeal. See Macris & Associates, Inc. v. Images & Attitudes, Inc., 941 P.2d 636 
(Utah App. 1997). The complaint in this case sought to make Neways and the Mowers 
liable for the claim against Images under three theories: fraudulent transfer, alter ego 
and successor corporation. 
The defendants moved for summary judgment in this action, arguing that the 
judgment against Images barred this action under principles of res judicata as they 
could and should have been litigated in the prior action. The trial court granted 
summary judgment to the defendants and Macris appealed. 
This Court reversed the ruling of the trial court, holding that the doctrine of 
claim preclusion was not a bar to this action. See Macris & Associates, Inc. v. 
Newavs, Inc., 1999 UT App. 230. Thereafter, the Supreme Court granted certiorari 
and affirmed in part and reversed in part. See Macris & Associates, Inc. v. Newavs, 
Inc., 2000 UT 93. The Supreme Court held that Macrisf claims in this action were not 
barred by claim preclusion but also held that under the doctrine of issue preclusion the 
contract damages to which Macris was entitled would be limited to those established in 
the Macris v. Images trial. 
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Following remand to the trial court, Neways caused the judgment entered on 
Maoris' behalf against Images to be satisfied. The defendants in the present action then 
moved for summary judgment, arguing that satisfaction of the judgment against Images 
rendered Macris' claim in this case moot. Macris resisted the motion as it pertained to 
the Mowers, arguing that the Mowers' conduct required Macris to bring suit against 
Neways to set aside the fraudulent transfer and that Macris' attorney fees in this action 
represented a consequential damage for which the Mowers should be liable and 
provided a basis for the imposition of possible punitive damages. The court granted the 
defendants' motion. 
On appeal, this Court reversed. See Macris & Associates, Inc. v. Neways, 
Inc.. 2002 UT App. 406. This Court held that Macris may have an entitlement to 
attorney fees (and possibly punitive damages). This Court held that 
in order to recover attorney fees under the third-party 
exception, Macris must also show that [this action] was a 
natural consequence of Image's breach and that it was 
necessary to bring this action. This is also a question of 
fact inappropriate for summary judgment. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Following remand, Macris served discovery requests upon defendants, 
essentially seeking to have defendants acknowledge that in 1992 the Mowers caused 
Images to transfer all its assets to Neways in exchange for no consideration, thereby 
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rendering Images incapable of satisfying any judgment rendered against it. These 
requests are set forth in the addendum hereto. 
Defendants responded to each discovery request with an identical objection 
and no other response. 
Defendants object to this interrogatory as irrelevant and 
not likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 
This action has been remanded to the District Court by 
the Court of Appeals for the express purpose of reaching 
a determination as to the propriety of awarding Plaintiff 
attorney fees against Defendants under the third-party 
litigation exception to the general rule that attorney fees 
are not recoverable in an action for breach of contract 
unless expressly provided for in the contract. In order to 
make this determination, Plaintiff must show that this 
action "was a natural consequence of Image's breach and 
that it was necessary to bring the action." Macris & 
Assoc, v. Newavs. Inc., 60 P.3d 1176 (Utah Ct. App. 
2002). Unless and until Plaintiff can show that this 
action was necessary in order to collect the judgment 
against Images and that plaintiff incurred attorney fees in 
pursuing the debt against Images, the parties do not need 
to address successor liability, alter ego liability, and/or 
fraudulent conveyance. Because Plaintiff has not yet 
shown that attorney fees were accrued in pursuing the 
judgment against Images, the issues of successor and 
alter ego liability and fraudulent conveyance that are 
addressed in this interrogatory are irrelevant and not 
likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 
R. File #3 at 829. 
Following this objection, Macris moved to compel and defendants sought a 
protective order barring any discovery. The trial court denied Macris' motion and 
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granted the defendants' motion, ruling that the discovery requests were "premature and 
may be unnecessary." R. File #3 at 860. 
Thereafter, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that 
they were entitled to summary judgment because Macris had failed to come forward 
with affirmative evidence that this action was made necessary by the alleged fraudulent 
transfer. 
Macris resisted the motion, arguing that the allegations of the complaint 
(which were unrebutted) and the history of the parties' litigation raised a reasonable 
inference that this action was necessary to pursue satisfaction of its claim, which 
inference could not be rejected on a motion for summary judgment. The trial court 
granted defendants' motion. 
The evidence relied on by defendants in seeking summary judgment was the 
fact that Macris first made written demand on Images for satisfaction of the judgment 
on February 1, 2001 and the judgment was satisfied on February 16, 2001. R. File #3 
at 885. These facts, coupled with Macris' failure to provide additional evidence in 
response to defendants' motion, were the basis upon which defendants argued an 
entitlement to judgment. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Macris' theory of why this action was necessary to recover on its claim 
against Images is very simple: by transferring all its assets to Neways, Images had 
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rendered itself unable to respond to Macris' claim and Macris needed to set aside that 
transfer to have Images' assets restored to it. In seeking to prove that Images 
fraudulently transferred all its assets, Macris propounded simple discovery requests 
inquiring into what was transferred, what was paid for it, and what assets were retained 
by Images. The defendants' argument, and the trial court's ruling, that defendants 
were not required to respond to such requests until Macris produced affirmative 
evidence, from sources other than the defendants, that this action was a necessary 
consequence of Images fraudulent transfer is both illogical and without support in the 
law. 
After denying Macris the opportunity to obtain pretrial proof of its claim 
from the defendants, the lower court compounded its error by granting summary 
judgment to defendants even though defendants offered no evidence whatsoever to rebut 
the allegations of plaintiff's complaint. Neways presented no evidence that the transfer 
it received from Images wasn't fraudulent or that it had the ability to satisfy Macris' 
claim. Despite this failure, Neways and the Mowers were granted summary judgment 
on the theory that Macris had some obligation to produce evidence, prior to trial, 
showing a prima facie entitlement to recovery. This ruling has no support in the law of 
Utah or any other jurisdiction. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. The Court Below Abused Its Discretion In Denying Plaintiff s Motion 
to Compel Discovery. 
Under Utah law, it is axiomatic that the discovery rules are to be interpreted 
liberally to permit discovery. As the Utah Supreme Court stated in State Road 
Comm'nv. Petty. 17 Utah 2d 382, 412 P.2d 914 (Utah 1966), 
A primary purpose of the new Rules of civil Procedure 
was to simplify procedures and to "secure the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." 
One of the means of accomplishing this is to permit 
discovery of information which will aid in eliminating 
noncontroversial matters, and in identifying, narrowing 
and clarifying the issues on which contest may prove to 
be necessary. Insofar as discovery will serve this 
purpose it should be liberally permitted. 
412 P.2d at 917. 
In the instant case, Macris sought discovery from the defendants designed to 
establish that Images fraudulently transferred its assets to Neways, that Images and 
Neways were both the alter egos of the Mowers, that Neways was the successor 
corporation of Images and that Images retained no assets with which it could satisfy 
Macris' claim. For example, interrogatory number 13 asked: "What assets owned by 
Images & Attitudes as of August 30, 1992, were not acquired by Neways, Inc. pursuant 
to the Asset Purchase Agreement dated August 31, 1992?" 
While acknowledging that the discovery requests were relevant to the three 
causes of action of plaintiff s complaint, defendants asserted that they need not respond 
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to such relevant inquiries "unless and until" Macris could demonstrate this action was 
necessary to recover on its claim against Images. This novel proposition, with which 
the court below agreed, was supported by no citation of authority and for good reason: 
there is none. Plaintiff is aware of no authority for the proposition that a plaintiff must 
make a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief before being permitted to conduct 
discovery. 
Rule 26(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part, 
that 
[parties] may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not 
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter 
involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the 
claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to te 
claim or defense of any other party, including the 
existence, description, matters, custody, condition and 
location of any books, documents, or other tangible 
things and the identity and location of persons having 
knowledge of any discoverable matter. 
The rule does not condition the right to discovery on some preliminary 
evidentiary showing of an entitlement to relief, nor has any appellate court ever so 
construed it. Indeed, both the Utah Supreme Court and several federal courts have held 
that the obligation to respond to discovery is not removed because a defendant has filed 
a motion to dismiss the complaint as legally insufficient to state a claim. In Schmitt v. 
Billings. 600 P.2d 516 (Utah 1979), the Court held that the pendency of a motion to 
dismiss did not relieve the defendants from their obligation to respond to discovery. 
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The court granted judgment to the plaintiff for the defendants' failure to timely respond 
to requests for admission even though they had moved to dismiss the complaint. See 
also. Lipskv v. Commonwealth United Corp.. 551 F.2d 887 (2d Cir. 1976); Alexander 
v. F.B.I. 194 F.R.D. 316 (D. D.C. 2000). 
If a party is entitled to discovery without even demonstrating that its 
complaint states a claim for relief, it can hardly be questioned that a party is entitled to 
discovery without first providing an evidentiary basis for its claim. 
The irony the ruling of the court below is that it deprived Macris from 
obtaining the very species of evidence the court felt it needed to provide to support its 
claim. Macris' theory of why the action against Neways was necessary to recovery on 
its claim against Images was simple: Images transferred all its assets to Neways and had 
nothing left from which the claim could be satisfied. If that transfer was fraudulent (as 
alleged), it could be set aside and the assets looked to for recovery. However, the 
court refused to require the defendants to say what they paid for the assets transferred 
or what Images had left following the transfer. Truthful responses to such questions 
would have revealed exactly why this suit was made necessary by the fraudulent 
transfer. 
The suggestion that a party should not have to respond to discovery until the 
court is convinced of the merits of the plaintiff's claim is inconsistent with the whole 
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purpose of the rules of discovery. As this Court said in Roundy v. Staley, 984 P.2d 
404, 407 (Utah App. 1999), the 
purpose [of Utah's discovery rules] is to make procedure 
as simple and efficient as possible by eliminating any 
useless ritual, undue rigidities or technicalities which 
may have become engrafted is our law; and to remove 
elements of surprise or trickery so the parties and the 
court can determine the facts and resolve the issues as 
directly, fairly and expeditiously as possible. 
984 P.2d at 407 (quoting Ellis v. Gilbert. 429 P.2d 39, 40 (Utah 1967)). 
This purpose is directly inconsistent with a ruling that no discovery could be 
had on plaintiffs claims "unless and until" plaintiff had made an evidentiary showing 
sufficient to satisfy the court of its likelihood of prevailing on the merits. That is a 
requirement unknown to modern discovery procedure and constitutes an abuse of the 
court's discretion. 
As this Court has previously held, a court's error in failing to require 
discovery is presumed to have been prejudicial and mandates reversal. In Askew v. 
Hardman, 884 P.2d 1258 (Utah App. 1994), reversed on other grounds, 918 P.2d 469 
(Utah 1996), this Court stated that 
[prejudice is presumed because to require the requesting 
party to show the error was harmful would place the 
requesting party in the untenable position of having to 
demonstrate that the contents of inaccessible information 
would have affected the outcome of the case. Because 
the requesting party does not have the information, he or 
she will never be able to demonstrate that the trial court's 
erroneous denial of a discovery request was anything but 
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harmless. The burden of demonstrating that the 
erroneous denial of a discovery request was not 
prejudicial must therefore rest with the party resisting 
discovery. 
884 P.2d at 1262-63. 
Accordingly, the judgment rendered below must be reversed. 
POINT II. The Court Below Erred in Granting Summary Judgment. 
The court below erred in granting summary judgment by placing an 
affirmative duty upon the plaintiff to offer evidence in support of its complaint when 
the law does not contain such a requirement and by failing to recognize that the 
undisputed facts in this case give rise to competing inferences which can only be 
resolved by the fact finder. 
The complaint alleged that Images fraudulently transferred its assets to 
Neways and was incapable of satisfying Macris' claim for breach of contract. The 
defendants have offered no evidence to the contrary. The undisputed facts are that 
Macris obtained judgment against Images in 1995. It was not paid, despite Macris1 
efforts to locate assets to execute upon. Thereafter, the court held that Neways was 
bound by the judgment and Macris garnished Neways' bank accounts. To obtain a 
release of the garnishments, Neways posted a bond pending its appeal of the trial 
court's ruling. This occurred in 1997. The case proceeded to this Court and then the 
Supreme Court. In each court Neways argued it had no liability for the judgment. In 
December of 2000, the court held that Neways may be liable to Macris but reversed the 
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trial court's decision that it was in privity with Images, holding a question of fact to be 
present. After Neways1 argument that it couldn't be held liable for the judgment 
against Images was rejected, the judgment was paid by a check drawn on Bank One 
which showed "Neways International, Inc." as the remitter of the check. R. File #3 at 
882-90. 
Macris suggests that the inference to be drawn from these facts is simple: 
when confronted with potential liability for receiving a fraudulent transfer (a charge it 
has never sought to refute), Neways saw the handwriting on the wall and paid up to 
avoid ongoing litigation expenses. 
The defendants suggest a different inference. Pointing to the evidence that 
counsel for Macris wrote to counsel for Images, a Neways' employee, and demanded 
payment of the judgment, which was satisfied within two weeks thereafter, defendants 
suggest it can be inferred that if Macris had simply asked Images to pay the judgment it 
would have done so without the need to sue Neways. 
Under the undisputed facts, the court below erred in granting summary for 
two reasons. First, in moving for summary judgment, defendants failed to meet their 
burden under Rule 56 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to establish the lack of a 
genuine issue of material fact. Second, the court ignored the inference available under 
the evidence which was favorable to the plaintiffs position, which it was improper to 
do. 
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In reviewing defendants' motion for summary judgment it is apparent that the 
defendants offered no evidence that the Images judgment would have been paid without 
the need for the Neways litigation. Indeed, they concede that they have no such 
evidence. f,[T]he parties will never know if the Images' judgment would have been 
satisfied because Macris failed to make a demand after judgment was entered." Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at p. 5 R. File #3 1072. 
Before a party moving for summary judgment can require the nonmoving 
party to produce evidence in support of the allegations of its complaint, the moving 
party must meet its burden of demonstrating the lack of a genuine issue of material fact. 
If it fails to do so the nonmoving party has no duty to present any evidence. 
This principle was enunciated in the landmark United States Supreme Court 
case of Adickes v. Kress & Co.. 398 U.S. 144 (1970), In Adickes, the plaintiff alleged 
that her civil rights had been violated as a result of a conspiracy between Kress and the 
city police. She alleged that she was denied service in a restaurant because she was in 
a racially mixed group. She alleged that when she was refused service there was a 
policeman in the store who subsequently arrested her outside the store for vagrancy. 
The defendant moved for summary judgment on the conspiracy claim, 
arguing that the plaintiff had no evidence of any conspiracy. The District Court 
granted the motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court, however, 
reversed. The court held that because the defendants had failed to meet their burden as 
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the moving party, plaintiff was under no duty to produce anything in opposition to the 
motion for summary judgment. 
As the moving party, respondent had the burden of 
showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, 
and for these purposes the material it lodged must be 
viewed in the light most favorable to the opposing party. 
398 U.S. at 157. 
After noting that the defendants had failed to negate with any evidence the 
allegation that an officer was present when the refusal to serve occurred, or therefore 
the inference that it was at his direction, the court noted that Rule 56(e) places no 
affirmative duty on the nonmoving party if the moving party has not met its burden. 
[B]oth the commentary and background of the 1963 
amendment conclusively shows that it was not intended 
to modify the burden of the moving party under Rule 
56(c) to show initially the absence a genuine issue 
concerning any material fact. The Advisory Committee 
note on the amendment states that the changes were not 
designed to "affect the ordinary standard applicable to 
summary judgment." And, in a comment directed 
specifically to a contention like respondents, the 
Committee stated that "[wjhere the evidentiary matter in 
support of the motion does not establish the absence of a 
genuine issue, summary judgment must be denied even if 
no opposing evidentiary matter is presented. 
398 U.S. at 159-60. (Emphasis in original). 
In the instant case, the defendants presented no evidence that Images had the 
capability of paying the claim of Macris. In the absence of such evidence they did not 
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meet their burden of negating a genuine issue of fact and Macris had no obligation to 
present any evidence on that point. 
Additionally, on the undisputed facts before the court, the evidence was 
susceptible to two different inferences, as set forth above, and it was error for the court 
to resolve those competing inferences in favor of the defendant. As this Court noted in 
West v. Thomson Newspapers. 835 P.2d 179 (Utah App. 1992), reversed on other 
grounds, 879 P.2d 999 (Utah 1994), citing Adickes, summary judgment cannot 
properly be granted unless the moving party presents evidence which would "foreclose 
[ ] the possibility of the existence of certain facts" from which a jury could draw an 
inference in favor of the nonmoving party. 835 P.2d at 188. See also, Goodman v. 
Sullivan, 2002 UT 21. 
In light of the defendants' failure to meet their burden under Rule 56, and the 
existence of competing inferences from the evidence before the court, it was error for 
the court to grant summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
The court below committed reversible error in failing to require defendants to 
respond to discovery. Such error requires that the judgment be vacated and the matter 
remanded with instructions to require the defendants to respond to plaintiff's discovery. 
Additionally, the court erred in granting summary judgment both on the basis 
of the record as it exists and by requiring plaintiff to offer affirmative evidence even 
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though defendants did not meet their burden under Rule 56. The judgment should be 
vacated and the matter remanded for trial. 
DATED this^jftldav of Ti\ft/wJL 2005. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
By Y^.MutJ.CrLA 
M. David Eckersley / l  
Attorneys for Appellant 
Maoris & Associates, Inc 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MACRIS & ASSOCIATES, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ] 
NEWAYS, INC., THOMAS E. MOWER, ) 
and LESLIE D. MOWER, J 
Defendants. ] 
) DEFENDANTS' RESPONSES 
) TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET 
) OF INTERROGATORIES 
) TO DEFENDANTS 
1 Civil No. 950400093CN 
Honorable Anthony Schofield 
Pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures, Defendants, Neways, 
Inc., Thomas E. Mower, and Leslie D. Mower ("Defendants"), respond to Plaintiffs First Set of 
Interrogatories to Defendants (the "Interrogatories"), as follows: 
HW H 2 209? 
UT DOCS A #1131144 v1 
GENERAL OBJECTIONS 
1. Defendants object to the Interrogatories on the grounds that they are 
overbroad, unduly burdensome, and seek information that is neither relevant to the subject matter 
of this action, nor likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 
2. Defendants object to the Interrogatories to the extent that th6y call for the 
production of information that is protected by the attorney-client privilege and the work-product 
doctrine. 
3. Defendants object to the Interrogatories to the extent that they purport to 
impose any obligations upon Defendants that exceed the obligations imposed by Rules 26, 33, 
and 34 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
4. Defendants object to the Interrogatories to the extent that they seek 
information for time periods other than those periods relevant to the determination of the issues 
in this dispute. 
Subject to the foregoing general objections and qualifications, and to any specific 
objection made below, Defendants responds as follows: 
RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Identify the shareholders of Neways? Inc. from 
September 1, 1992 to the present, indicating amounts of shares owned by each shareholder 
identified. 
RESPONSE: Defendants object to this interrogatory as irrelevant and not likely 
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. This action has been remanded to the District 
UT DOCS A #1131144 v1 2 
Court by the Court of Appeals for the express purpose of reaching a determination as to the 
propriety of awarding Plaintiff attorney fees against Defendants under the third-party litigation 
exception to the general rule that attorney fees are not recoverable in an action for breach of 
contract unless expressly provided for in the contract. In order to make this determination, 
Plaintiff must show that this action "was a natural consequence of Image's breach and that it was 
necessary to bring the action." Macric & Assoc, v. Neways, Inc., 60 P.3d 1176, 1181 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2002). Unless and until Plaintiff can show that this action was necessary in order to collect 
the judgment against Images and that Plaintiff incurred attoimey fees in pursuing the debt against 
Images, the parties do not need to address successor liability, alter ego liability, and/or fraudulent 
conveyance. Because Plaintiff has not yet shown that this action was necessary in order to 
collect the judgment against Images, which judgment was paid in full on February 16, 2001, and 
because Plaintiff has not yet shown that attorney fees were accrued in pursuing the judgment 
against Images, the issues of successor and alter ego liability and fraudulent conveyance that are 
addressed in this interrogatory are irrelevant and not likely to lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: What consideration was paid by Neways, Inc. to 
Images & Attitudes, Inc. for the acquisition of the assets of Images & Attitudes, Inc.? 
RESPONSE: See Response to Interrogatory 1, which is incorporated herein by 
reference. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: When was such consideration paid? 
UT_DOCS_A #1131144 v1 3 
RESPONSE: See Response to Interrogatory 1, which is incorporated herein by 
reference. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: How was such consideration paid? 
RESPONSE: See Response to Interrogatory 1, which is incorporated herein by 
reference. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Who negotiated with Images & Attitudes, Inc. on 
behalf of Neways, Inc. in connection with Neways, Inc.'s acquisition of the assets of Images & 
Attitudes, Inc.? 
RESPONSE: See Response to Interrogatory 1, which is incorporated herein by 
reference. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Who negotiated with Neways, Inc. on behalf of 
Images & Attitudes, Inc., in connection with Neways, Inc.'s acquisition of the assets of Images 
& Attitudes, Inc.? 
RESPONSE: See Response to Interrogatory 1, which is incorporated herein by 
reference. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: Indicate what liabilities of Images & Attitudes, 
Inc., Neways, Inc. did not intend to assume pursuant to the Asset Purchase Agreement dated 
August 31, 1992. 
RESPONSE: See Response to Interrogatory 1, which is incorporated herein by 
reference. 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 8: Indicate all amounts paid by Neways, Inc. on the 
long term debts listed on the balance sheet of Images & Attitudes dated 8/31/92. 
RESPONSE: See Response to Interrogatory 1, which is incorporated herein by 
reference. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 9: Indicate to whom each of the notes payable listed 
on the Images & Attitudes, Inc. balance sheet of 8/31/92 were owed and when such obligations 
were due. 
RESPONSE: See Response to Interrogatory 1, which is incorporated herein by 
reference. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 10: Identify the Board of Directors of Neways, Inc. 
as of August 31, 1992. 
RESPONSE: See Response to Interrogatory 1, which is incorporated herein by 
reference. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: Identify the Board of Directors of Images & 
Attitudes, Inc. as of August 31, 1992. 
RESPONSE: See Response to Interrogatory 1, which is incorporated herein by 
reference. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: What was the total value of the assets owned by 
Neways, Inc. as of August 30,1992. 
RESPONSE: See Response to Interrogatory 1, which is incorporated herein by 
reference. 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 13: What assets owned by Images & Attitudes, Inc. 
as of August 30, 1992, were not acquired by Neways, Inc. pursuant to the Asset Purchase 
Agreement dated August 31, 1992. 
RESPONSE: See Response to Interrogatory 1, which is incorporated herein by 
reference. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Did Neways, Inc. pay any legal expenses of 
Images & Attitudes, Inc. which were incurred after September 1, 1992? 
RESPONSE: See Response to Interrogatory 1, which is incorporated herein by 
reference. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 15: If the answer to the preceding interrogatory is 
yes, state the reason such payments were made. 
RESPONSE: See Response to Interrogatory 1, which is incorporated herein by 
reference. 
DATED this of May 2003. 
BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS & INGERSOLL, LLP 
Mark R. Gaylord, Esq. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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Mark R. Gaylord, Esq. (#5073) 
BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS & INGERSOLL, LLP 
One Utah Center, Suite 600 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2221 
Telephone: (801)531-3000 
Facsimile: (801)531-3001 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MACRIS & ASSOCIATES, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ] 
NEWAYS, INC., THOMAS E. MOWER, ) 
and LESLIE D. MOWER, ) 
Defendants. ] 
) DEFENDANTS' RESPONSES TO 
) PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR 
) ADMISSIONS TO DEFENDANTS 
1 Civil No. 950400093CN 
Honorable Anthony Schofield 
Pursuant to Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures, Defendants, Neways, 
Inc., Thomas E. Mower, and Leslie D. Mower ("Defendants"), respond to Plaintiffs Request for 
Admission to Defendants (the "Requests"), as follows: 
GENERAL OBJECTIONS 
1. Defendants object to the Requests because they improperly seek to use 
pretrial discovery to obtain premature disclosure of Defendants' trial witnesses and exhibits. 
RECE'VED 
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Prince N 'V_- >\Ge'dzahief 
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Discovery in this case has not been completed, and as such, Defendants have not determined the 
witnesses they intend to call or the documents and exhibits they intend to use at the trial of this 
matter. As such, the Requests seek to require speculation about Defendants' future decisions, 
and further seek to require information immune from discovery, because it constitutes opinion 
work product. Defendants shall provide such information in accordance with Rule 26(a)(4) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2. Defendants object to the Requests to the extent that they call for the 
production of information and documents that are protected by the attorney-client privilege and 
the work-product doctrine. 
3. Defendants objects to the Requests to the extent that they purport to 
impose any obligations upon Defendants that exceed the obligations imposed by Rules 26, 33, 
and 34 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
4. Defendants object to the Requests on the ground that they are overbroad, 
unduly burdensome, and seek information that is neither relevant to the subject matter of this 
action, nor likely to lead to the discovery of admissible. 
RESPONSES TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS 
REQUEST NO. 1: Admit that the long term debt listed on the Images & 
Attitudes, Inc. balance sheet as of 8/31/92 as "Note-pay - Australia $699,276.55" is a false entry. 
RESPONSE: Defendants object to this interrogatory as irrelevant and not likely 
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. This action has been remanded to the District 
Court by the Court of Appeals for the express purpose of reaching a determination as to the 
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propriety of awarding Plaintiff attorney fees against Defendants under the third-party litigation 
exception to the general rule that attorney fees are not recoverable in an action for breach of 
contract unless expressly provided for in the contract. In order to make this determination, 
Plaintiff must show that this action "was a natural consequence of Image's breach and that it was 
necessary to bring the action." Macric & Assoc, v. Neways, Inc., 60 P.3d 1176, 1181 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2002). Unless and until Plaintiff can show that this action was necessary in order to collect 
the judgment against Images and that Plaintiff incurred attorney fees in pursuing the debt against 
Images, the parties do not need to address successor liability, alter ego liability, and/or jfraudulent 
conveyance. Because Plaintiff has not yet shown that this action was necessary in order to 
collect the judgment against Images, which judgment was paid in full on February 16, 2001, and 
because Plaintiff has not yet shown that attorney fees were accrued in pursuing the judgment 
against Images, the issues of successor and alter ego liability and fraudulent conveyance that are 
addressed in this interrogatory are irrelevant and not likely to lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence. 
REQUEST NO. 2: Admit Neways, Inc. made no cash payment to Images & 
Attitudes, Inc. pursuant to the terms of Exhibit C to the Asset Purchase Agreement dated August 
31, 1992. 
RESPONSE: Defendants incorporate by this reference their response to 
Request No. 1 as though fully set forth herein. 
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DATED this ^ ^ day of May 2003. 
BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS & INGERSOLL, LLP 
Mark R. Gaylord, Esq 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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